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Introduction
On November the 9 th 1989 the Wall of Berlin felt. During twenty-seven years it had been the material symbol of the post-war division of Germany and Europe into two blocks: the communist one strictly controlled by the U.S.S.R. on the East side, and the liberist one linked to the U.S.A. on the West side.
Eleven months later, Germany and Berlin were again united after a division lasted more than forty years.
The challenge of the new German government was now the harmonisations of the two parts of the unique body; better, the need was to render the eastern Länder market-oriented in the shortest time as possible.
Before restructuring the industry and building a new financial system, it was necessary and mandatory to re-build the culture of the citizens (for the second time in less than half a century). And perhaps this latter task was the most challenging and the most important to carry on: the depth and the radicalism of the reforms to be implemented require a strong people's support in order to be successful (Williamson, 1994) .
It must also be noted that while the institutional and socio-economic changes in Eastern Germany were very deep, Western Germany had to bear the most of the costs of the transition.
Claiming, as Giavazzi and McMahon (2005) do, that a lack of support was present is not correct;
better, it should be highlighted that eastern Germans' support diminished (reaching figures that indicate opposition to a market economy) during the hardest period of economic restructuring. Then this trend reverted. However a caveat is necessary: the nature of the data does not allow for absolute, but only for relative comparisons 4
; and these are with respect to the status quo at the time of the interview. This means that people evaluate the situation as it is when they are interviewed and are partially influenced by it. So the support to a given institutional structure usually changes with the results that it produces. Consider for example a financial market: people will be favourable to it, when prices raise and less favourable when prices decline. However, this does not attenuate the strength of the results, nor undermine them, and does not change the conclusions of the paper. These are still valid for at least two reasons: the first is that I offer a sound comparison term: West Germans' preferences; the second is that the trend of the preferences (and the preferences themselves) with respect to the status quo is (are) meaningful and clearly interpretable per se.
My results can be interpreted as an enrichment of the evidence offered by Alesina and FuchsSchündeln (2007) , but I also offer a partially contrasting reading. Namely I claim that the manifest difference of preferences between western and eastern Germans is not (completely) directly related to the effects of a communist legacy, but rather to the period of economic distress that immediately followed the reunification.
This paper enriches the extant literature for at least two reasons: first it examines some preferences for a market economy that the previous works have not taken into consideration; second it provides some empirical support to Blanchard (1997) . A third contribution (though minor with respect to the other two) is to try to offer some empirical support to Williamson (1994) too: in absence of people's support, the reforms in Germany should not have been so quick and successful.
Data and methodology
Data are from 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004 waves of the World Value Survey (WVS)5.
The responders are almost evenly distributed across these waves and across the two parts of Germany.
World Value Survey is not a panel, but a collection of cross-sections, where the interviewees change from wave to wave. Of course this impedes the use of panel data analysis and obliges to use cross-sectional approaches.
The first variable that I consider measures the individual evaluation of competition per se; it is the answer to the following question: " .
Sentences: Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people". In this case 1 means to
consider competition as good and as stimulating people to work and to develop new ideas, whilst 10 means to think that competition is harmful.
The second and the third questions attain the role of the government in the economy. Specifically, they ask the respondents to grade the following couples of sentences: "Private ownership of business should be increased vs. Government ownership of business should be increased" and "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for". In both cases answering 10 definitely means to support the intervention of the government in the economy. In both cases the responder's preference against the rules of competition and of a free market is stronger as the grade increases.
The fourth question is again about the intervention of the government in the economy, but it refers to a different and more modern approach of intervention: regulation. The question asks the interviewee to grade his/her preference for the strength of the public regulation over firms. The couple of sentences to be graded is: "The state should give more freedom to firms vs. The state should control firms more effectively".
Here 1 means to prefer freedom vs. strong regulation (10). Although regulation is not necessarily a negative aspect for competition and free market, I interpret high marks mistrusting a market left to be completely free and competitive. Notice that this question was asked in the third wave only, so no time path can be discussed in this case. Although not exhaustive, the analysis of these four variables sheds some light on the preferences of German citizens about some fundamental characteristics of a market economy. I must, however, underline that the meaning of "control the firms more effectively" can vary across different interpretations. On the one hand an effective control could be represented by effective antitrust policies, environmental regulation, fiscal inspections, and so on. On the other hand one might interpret that sentence as direct control of the government over the firms. In either case the preference expressed for the second sentence involves a public intervention in the economy, as opposed to deregulation and in this broad sense the answer has to be interpreted throughout the paper 7
, having in mind all the possible nuances.
The nature of the data used in this paper is such that they are suitable for the present analysis and for the goals of this paper. They are not mere absolute grades assigned to a specific preference.
Respondents are required to grade a couple of sentences of opposite meaning; this induces the interviewee to identify the present situation as the reference (median) point and hence to compare his/her preference/opinion with this. This easies the comparability of subjective answers, as it is reasonable to assume that the respondent has a good knowledge of the current situation. Theoretically the questions used in this paper are interrelated, in the sense that a person who has strong preferences for a market vs. a planned economy will likely have also strong preferences against the public intervention in the economy.
However other works (for example Migheli 2010) show that the correlation may be weaker than supposed.
In particular people who are in principle favourable to a market economy and to competition, nevertheless ask their governments to regulate the market and to sustain extensive welfare systems (the socio-7 Given that the communist system was on its way to be dismantled and substituted with a capitalist system, my personal interpretation is that the answer to the question has rather the first than the second of the proposed senses.
democratic Scandinavian countries are a clear example of this). Hence the answers to the questions used in the present paper aim at analysing and disentangling preferences over different aspects of a market economy, assuming that they are less linear and more multifaceted that what one might expect in principle.
The investigation involves both univariate and multivariate analysis. In the latter I include income and gender as controls. Several studies on eastern European countries (for example Vecernik, 1995; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995; Rutkowski, 1996 and Brainerd, 1998) show that returns on education are higher in a market economy than in a central planned economy, therefore more educated people would tend to be in favour of reforms more than others; also Duch (1993) , Gabel and Palmer (1995) , Gabel (1998a and 1998b) , Eble and Koeva (2002) and Hayo (2004) find support for this conclusion in a sample of formerly communist European countries. Here I do not use the level of education as a control for the following reason: I would be comparing two different educational systems and two different types of ideological education within the same country, and furthermore the data implicitly attach the same value to the same formal educational level (i.e. a university degree is graded the same for both a western and an eastern citizen). This would undermine the reliability of the results and therefore their interpretation. The reference category for the computation of the marginal effects in the case of income is the first decile of the distribution of incomes.
Additional regressors 8 are: age (and its squared value in order to control for a U-shaped effect), the size of the interviewee's town, his/her marital status, individual income and the respondent's employment status (divided into four categories: self-employed, full-time employed, part-time employed or unemployed -taken as reference). Differently from Grier (1997) Age is another important control: old people have experienced more institutional changes, and thus their preferences are based also on a strong experience in addition to education. At the same time, they tend to regret the past. Among others Hayo (1999) finds a U-shaped pattern for age:
support for a market economy first increases and then decreases. Here I expect the same result at least for Eastern Germany, also in the light of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) . Some nostalgia of the past regime (see Easterlin and Plagnol, 2008 in the case of eastern German States) could then affect the preferences of the people belonging to the central age cohorts and, to a lesser extent, the elderly as they should balance nostalgia with the experience of the market institutions before the War. However this non-linearity of age can also derive from the fact that expected income losses from transition may vary with cohorts.
The time path is identified through a discrete variable coding the waves. This variable takes the values 1, 2 and 3, which are increasing in time. This means that the 1989 -1993 wave is coded as 1, the following wave as 2, and the last one as 3. This allows for assessing whether there is a change of these preferences over the time, which is not captured by the previous controls (wave 1 is taken as reference category).
I analyze firstly the whole sample in order to answer the main question of this paper, i.e. 
Results
The tables show both the coefficients and the marginal effects so that the reader can see the magnitude of the effect of each control on a discrete "jump" of the dependent variable. Table 1 presents the evolution of Germans' preferences over the time. For each considered variable, for each of the two historical blocks of current Germany and for each wave of the WVS, I calculated the mean grade; then the significance of the difference between each pair of means is calculated. It is possible to notice that in the eastern Länder the aversion to competition has increased from the first to the second wave, and then has kept statistically unchanged. The interpretation for this result is that is that in 1990 eastern Germans viewed competition as the dream of freedom from the dictatorship, so they wanted to pass from the past regime to the new model and for this reason looked for the institutions of a market economy. Competition was something near to a synonymous for freedom. Thereafter they got the wished institutions and learnt that competition is good, but is not the heaven or the solution to all the problems inherited from the past regime. However their opinion about competition per se has never attained a value that may indicate opposition to it and the means are different from western Germans' only for the first wave, suggesting two remarks.
First: considering the second and the third waves, we can conclude that the opinion about competition was the same in both parts of Germany, and it is plausible to assume that around 2000 both western and eastern Germans had the same concept of competition (Alesina and FuchsSchündeln, 2007) . Second: excluding the first wave (when eastern Germans had a better opinion of competition than western Germans had -but we have to remind that in 1990 the neutral preference was likely to mean different things in the two parts of the federation), there is no statistical difference between the eastern and the western average grades. Therefore it is not true that, over the time, eastern Germans have had a worse opinion about competition than their western compatriots.
In the first wave eastern Germans showed a (rather strong) preference for private rather than state ownership of firms. Between 1990 and 1995 their preference changed dramatically: the mean shifted towards a (very weak) preference for state ownership and five years later they were, on average, indifferent (the mean was statistically not different from 5). Moreover if in 1990 western
Germans were less favourable to private ownership than the eastern, this situation reversed 11 in the following years. Here we can weakly detect the U-shaped path predicted by Blanchard (1997) . The table shows also the same tests for the preference over the public intervention to ensure that no citizen is in need. Here the U-shaped time path is very evident. Moreover there is an appreciable jump from some preference for no intervention to a strong opposite position, which appears much mitigated in the third wave.
11 And the difference between East and West was significant at 99% level.
The next tables report the results of the ordered probit regressions (notice that the marginal effects are reported at medians 12 ). The dependent variables are the questions summarized in the previous section. Each table reports the coefficients of the controls in the fist column, and the respective marginal effects in the other nine columns. These results support those commented previously. Considering the opinion about competition (see tables 2, 2bis and 2ter), the "East" dummy takes a negative and significant value. According with the same table, the coefficient for the wave is positive and significant, and it is driven by both parts of the country. This means that competition has lost some appeal in all the Länder. The dummy capturing the respondents living in the former DDR is always highly significant, indicating that the opinion about competition and the preferences for a stronger public intervention in the economy are different between the two blocks.
In particular eastern Germans have a better opinion of competition than western Germans have.
Notice that this result is highly significant, even after controlling for the wave of the survey. This suggests that, once data have been depurated by the effect of the other controls included in the regression, the results shown in Table 1 are reinforced. The marginal effects show the magnitude of the effect captured by the sign of the coefficients. It is interesting to notice that while influent among Western citizens, income does not exert any effect on the opinion about competition of the Eastern respondents (tables 2bis vs. table 2ter).
Beyond the geographic ideological partition highlighted by the tables, another difference between East and West is worthy to be mentioned. One of the pillars of the communist doctrine is the absence of any difference between the genders. In general the economic literature (see for example Camerer, 2003) finds women to be more risk averse than men. As a consequence women are expected to favour the intervention of the government in the economy more than men do. This is exactly what I find in the case of the whole German sample and of western German respondents;
but when the East block is isolated, the dummy capturing the gender of the interviewee looses its significance (see tables 2bis and 2ter, and 5bis and 5ter, though in these two last tables the effect is weaker). This means that opinions and preferences about competition and related topics are not affected by gender within eastern Germans. Although I do not provide (as my data do not allow me for) conclusive evidence that this outcome results as a legacy of the communist regime, this result seems to be stronger than a simple coincidence.
The self-classification of the respondent as a religious person is generally associated with a preference for competition, rather than state intervention; this holds in both Eastern and Western Germany, without significant differences.
The coefficients and the marginal effects for age (and its squared value) show a reversed Ushaped effect only in the case of the preference for an increasing state ownership of firms (tables 3, 3bis and 3ter). In the case of the preference about firm regulation, the effect of age has a different sign in Western than in Eastern Germany. In particular these signs suggest that the old in the West and the young in the East perceive a stronger regulation of private firms as desirable. The effect of age is then significant in Western Germany (but not in the other part), when the dependent variable is the opinion about competition: the younger the interviewee, the worse the grade of competition as a good. Furthermore, and basically in disaccord with Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) , I do not find any significant effect of age on the preference about the intervention in the government to ensure basic welfare.
Eventually it is worthy to briefly comment about the effect of the type of work contract. In general self employed people and full time workers 13 show a strong and significant preference for competition and its related aspects. This is apparently not the case for Germans (see tables 2, 3, 4 and 5), although among self-employed workers many are professionals: in principle these categories could be positively affected by a high level of market regulation, as more subjects would need their services. Hence this results does not suggest that entrepreneurs are less pro-competition than unemployed and pensioners, but may simply a consequence of the composition of the category. The position of people working part-time is not very clear and almost never significant. This could result as a consequence of the fact that some workers in this group chose this type of contract voluntarily (for example in the case of young mothers), and some found only this kind of employment, while they would have preferred a full-time job. It is possible (and perhaps likely) that these two components of the group have different preferences about competition, and that summing them up makes the coefficient scarcely significant.
At this point it is important to add a consideration. The differences detected between eastern and western Länder can be imputable to several different factors, with are likely present all in a while. The aim of the paper is not to disentangle them with surety; nevertheless some results are interpretable as possible legacies of the past communist regime. Of course also other interpretations are possible: so for example eastern women may be more prone to work than western because the economic conditions of the households are worse in the East than in the West.
Conclusions
In this paper I provide substantial support for the findings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2009), but I also highlight a time path, which is somewhat more complex than the one found by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln. In particular I show that overall eastern Germans are less marketoriented than western Germans are. Overall eastern Germans have a worse opinion of competition per se with respect to the responders of the western Länder. In addition they prefer more than western responders an intervention of the government in the economy through state ownership and regulation of firms and provision of essential welfare.
After more than a decade of since reunification, the two parts of Germany seem still divided with respect to some focal topics of economic policy. In particular, although both the western and the eastern Germans have the same opinion about how beneficial competition is (or could be), in the East Germans still show preferences for an intervention of the government in the economy, which are stronger than those expressed in the West. Although this situation could be easily ascribed to the recent past, and these results can be interpreted as a legacy of the communist regime, I thinks that another interpretation is possible. If before the unification everybody was almost sure to find a job, afterwards this was no longer true, both because some factories needed closing as they were too obsolete 14 , and because in the West the employers mistrusted the quality of the eastern manpower.
Therefore, as unemployment rates were much higher in the East than in the West, it is not surprising that eastern Germans claimed for more public intervention, than western Germans did. And this is not necessarily related to some communist legacy: the same behaviour can easily be found in any other country (included the U.S.A. and the U.K.) that has never known a communist regime. A point in favour of this interpretation is the absence of any difference between the eastern and the western opinion about how beneficial competition is.
As a conclusion, although the two parts of Germany still show evident and significant differences, I claim that this does not reflect only an ideological position somewhat linked to the recent past of (some states of) the country. There are causes linked to the transition process (and thus transitory by definition), which can justify the actual distance between the preferences. As a consequence this distance is going to disappear faster than generally thought, provided that the current economic problems of the eastern Länder will be solved in a short period of time. The results of this paper allow for considering this reading of the data as a valid and robust complement (or alternative) to the current and widespread interpretation of an ideological communist legacy.
Eventually the fact that in 1990 the support for a market economy was apparently larger among eastern than western interviewees should be largely ascribed to two causes: first to the fact that the eastern hopes and dreams were built on the idealization of the western market economy as a synonym of freedom, and, second, to the nature of the used data, which represent relative preferences with respect to a status quo, rather than absolute preferences. In any case the German road towards a complete homogenization of the two parts is only a matter of time, perhaps and likely shorter than expected. )*** (7*10 -4 )*** (4*10-4)*** (3*10-4)*** (3*10-4)*** (1*10 -4 )*** (2*10 -4 )** (6*10 -5 )** (7*10 -6 )** (1*10 -7 )*** (1*10 -7 )* (1*10 -7 )* (1*10 -7 )** (1*10 -7 )** (1*10 -7 )** (1*10 -7 )** (1*10 -5 )* Dependent variable: preference about the responsible agent to ensure that everybody is provided for (10 digits): 10 = government; 0 = private citizens.
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